The Dynamic Properties of Party Identification: a Four-Nation Comparison by LeDuc, Lawrence
European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981) 257-268 
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam. Printed inThe Netherlands 
The Dynamic Properties of Party 
Identification: a Four-Nation Comparison 
LAWRENCE LeDUC 
University of Windsor, Canada 
ABSTRACT 
Among the most important elements in assessing the cross-national utility of the concept of party 
identification is its stability over time, in particular its stability relative to that of voting choice. This article 
utilizes three-wave panel studies in Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and the United States to 
measure the nature and extent of changes in individual partisanship over a period of three to six years. It is 
argued that there is substantial instability in party identification when all types of change are taken into 
account, and that the United States appears unique among the cases examined in its ability to combine 
stable partisanship with instability o f  voting behaviour for reascins relating to the particular nature o f  the 
American electoral systcm. In Britain and Canada, party identification exhibits a greater tendency to 
travel with vote, while in the Netherlands it is less stable than the vote itsclf. 
The utility of the concept of party identification in voting research, as well as several 
controversies surrounding its application and interpretation, is well known. 
American scholars, having observed the erosion of partisanship in the American 
electorate in the late 1960s and early 1970s, have drawn differing conclusions 
regarding the implications which these phenomena may have for the theory of party 
identification as a relatively enduring social-psychological attachment in that 
country. In cross-national research, scholars have differed widely regarding the 
applicability of party identification in multi-party systems or in those undergoing 
fundamental change. At the very least, non-American scholars have agreed that 
party identification tends to behave differently in different political environments, 
even where there is no serious problem of conceptual similarity. Butler and Stokes 
(1969; 1975) first observed the greater tendency of party identification to travel with 
the vote in Britain than in the United States, even though the over-all level of 
stability of partisanship was comparable in the two countries. Scholars in some other 
countries (Meisel, 1975; Thomassen, 1976) have questioned the utility of the concept 
of party identification in countries where it exhibits a strong tendency to change with 
vote or is less stable than voting behaviour over time. 
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As these comments suggest, the concept of party identification as originally 
formulated depends heavily on its relative stability over time. Clearly, in the 
American case, party identification is more stable than voting choice, whatever may 
be the other controversies surrounding its interpretation. In part this is because of 
the unique features of the American electoral system, which demand a number of 
voting decisions of the individual, and the wide swings which have occurred routinely 
in American presidential elections since 1964. The stability of partisanship in other 
countries however, even in comparison with vote, is less certain. One difficulty in 
resolving this issue has been the absence of reliable measures of stability, which must 
normally be derived from panel data collected over more than one national election. 
Except in Britain, where panel studies have been conducted regularly since 1963. 
such studies are rare. Slowly, however, a sufficient number of panel studies 
containing comparable measures is becoming available to permit the investigation of 
the stability of party identification and vote in a truly cross-national context. These 
studies can help to answer a number of questions, among them being the extent to 
which other countries exhibit a degree of stability in party identification relative to 
vote and the extent to which the United States may in fact be a unique case with 
regard to the linkage between party identification and voting choice. Only by means 
of an analysis which includes a range of national cases can such questions be 
addressed. 
1. METHODS AND DATA 
This analysis utilizes survey data from panel studies in four nations - Britain, 
Canada, the United States and the Netherlands. The criteria for selection of these 
studies were that they contain equivalent measures of party identification and that 
they contain non-recall information on individual voting behaviour or vote intention 
collected at three separate time points. In the case of the Canadian and U.S.A. 
panels, data were collected at the time of three national elections (1974, 1979 and 
1980 in Canada, and 1972, 1974 and 1976 in the United States).’ In the British case, 
respondents were first interviewed in 1969 and then again following the general 
elections of 1970 and February 1974.2 The Dutch panel was begun in 1970, and 
respondents were interviewed following the Second Chamber elections of 1971 and 
1972.3 Three of the panels are of approximately comparable length, while that for the 
Netherlands is somewhat shorter, a fact that may be kept in mind in interpreting 
degree and rates of change. 
For purposes of this analysis, a common definition and measure of party 
identification is employed across the four studies. All of the studies utilize the 
American-style question to establish direction of party identification, although there 
are slight variations in question wording, a factor which could cause differences in 
the level of identification (Kaase, 1976): ‘Generally speaking, do you think of 
yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, or what?’ The American studies include 
the option ‘Independent’ in the text of the question, while the others do not. The 
Dutch surveys use the term ‘adherent‘ and do not name the parties in the text of the 
question: ‘Do you usually think of yourself as an adherent of a certain party or not? 
(IF YES) Which party do you like best?’ Nevertheless, the measures exhibit a high 
degree of similarity. Greater comparability can be obtained by imposing a uniform 
categorization across the studies. All four sets of surveys contain a probe for those 
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TABLE 1. The structure of party identification in four national samples 
(diagonal percentages) 
(a) Britain, Feb. 1974 
(N = 2394) 
Very Fairly Weak/ 
strong strong leaning 
Conservativc 12 18 8 
Labour 17 18 9 
Liberal 2 7 5 
Othe? 1 I X 
None 3 
(c) Netherlands, 1970 
(N = 1813) 
Not 
Strong strong Leaning 
PvdAb 5 7 
KVph 6 7 
VVD 2 3 
D’66 I 3 
ARP 2 3 
CHU 2 2 
All other 2 1 
None 
8 
5 
6 
7 
2 
2 
3 
23 
(b) Canada, 1974 
(N = 2343) 
Very Fairly Weak1 
strong strong leaning 
Liberdl 16 23 11 
Progressive- 
Conservative 7 11 6 
NDP 4 5 2 
Social Credit 1 1 1 
None 12 
(d) U.S.A.,  1Y76 
(N = 2862) 
1nd.i 
Strong Weak leaning 
Democratic 15 21 12 
Republican 11 15 8 
Independenti 
None 15 
aIncludes Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru. 
%eludes scattering of mentions of party groupings. 
‘1,ess than 1% 
respondents who classify themselves as Independents or who refuse a party 
identification to determine whether they ‘lean toward’ or ‘feel closer to’ any of the 
parties. In this analysis, all respondents indicating a partisan attachment on any of 
these measures or probes are classified as party identifiers. In the case of the 
American and Dutch studies, this reduces substantially the number of Independents 
and provides greater comparability with the British and Canadian surveys. It is also 
possible to construct a three-point intensity measure in each of the four countries, 
although the wording of the intensity question varies slightly among the four cases. 
Following these uniform methods of classification, the distribution of party 
identification shown in Table I is obtained for the largest sample cross-section survey 
in each of the four series. The number of non-identifiers (including both 
self-described Independents and those indicating no party attachment) varies from a 
high of 23% in the Netherlands to a low of 4% in Britain. The proportion of 
respondents reporting the strongest level of attachment possible within the limits of 
the survey questions varies from 18% in the Netherlands to 30% in Britaim4 In both 
instances, Canada and the United States show a similar pattern and fall near the 
centre of the distribution. However, these national differences, which can easily be 
affected by question wording, need not greatly concern u5, although they do serve to 
demonstrate the basic similarities across systems in the pattern of party identification 
when equivalent measures are employed. Of greater interest is the level of change 
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across time indicated within each of the four national panels, which can be more 
reliably measured because the question itself is constant across all three waves in 
each country. 
2. MEASURING CHANGE 
We begin by examining turnover across a pair of elections by the tabular method 
most often employed for this purpose. Perhaps surprisingly, the over-all level of 
stability in the four nations is similar (Table II), with Canada, the Netherlands and 
the United States displaying virtually identical proportions of their respective 
electorates that are stable with respect to both party identification and vote across a 
pair of national elections. The proportion in Britain exhibiting such stability between 
the 1970 and February 1974 elections is slightly higher than in the other three cases, 
but exactly equal to the level found by Butler and Stokes for the 1963-66 period. In 
spite of the similarity in over-all patterns of stability among the four nations, the 
differing patterns of linkage between party identification and vote come through 
clearly in the comparison. Party identification in total (considering the upper left and 
upper right cells together) is more stable in the United States than in Britain, in spite 
of the greater over-all level of stability (upper left cell only) in the latter country. 
Only the United States among the four displays the classic pattern of partisan 
stability coupled with vote switching to any great extent, and this cell (upper right) 
accounts for most of the variation in the American case.‘ As Butler and Stokes 
observed in the 1963-66 comparison, there is a greater tendency for party 
identification to travel with vote in Britain compared with the United States, but 
there is an even greater such tendency in Canada and the Nctherlands, a pattern 
which has been noted in both countries in single-national studies (Jenson, 1975; 
Thomassen, 1976). 
The failure of any of the other three countries to exhibit the American pattern of 
stable partisanship and variable vote, coupled with the tendency there of 
partisanship to travel with vote to a greater extent than in the United States does 
much to illuminate the unique characteristics of the American electoral environment 
and the special role that party identification tends to play in that setting. 
Nevertheless, the comparisons of 2 x 2 patterns of party identification and vote 
shown in Table I1 are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, independents 
or non-identifiers are excluded from these comparisons, a fact which may be 
particularly significant in the Netherlands and the United States, both of these being 
party systems which contain many independents and/or ‘leaning’ party identifiers. 
The movement over time of non-identifiers or marginal identifiers may be an 
important source of change in these systems and should be examined. Converse 
(1966), for example, found that in the United States the proportion of respondents in 
the 195MO panel study moving between a party identification and independence 
was far greater than the percentage changing parties, and other analysts of American 
data such as Dobson and St. Angelo (1975) have routinely treated the movement of 
individuals between independence and identification as equivalent to partisan 
change. Further, the inclusion of all types of movement in the analysis helps to 
produce greater measurement equi~alence for purposes of cross-national 
comparison. Cain and Ferejohn (1981) have shown that it is thc inclusion of Liberal 
party identifiers in Britain in the analysis, combined with the exclusion of American 
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TABLE IT. Turnover of party identification and vote in four two-wave election panels 
(diagonal percentages) 
(a) Britain (197G74) 
stable variable stable variable 
(b) Canada (1974-79) 
Vote Vote 
stable 75 10 70 10 
Party 
Identification 
variable 5 to 5 15 
Nb = 795 841 
(c)Netherlands (1971-72) (d) U.S.A. (1972-76) 
stable variable stable variable 
Vote Votea 
stable 71 4 71 22 
Party 
Identification 
variable 7 18 4 3 
Nb = 449 539 
"For House of Representatives. 
bParty identifiers and voters in both elections only. 
independents, which accounts for the observed tendency of party identification to 
travel with vote in Britain to a greater extent than in the United States. Inclusion in 
the analysis of partisans and non-partisans alike in all countries will minimize the 
danger of conclusions which do not truly reflect national differences. 
The same point may be made with regard to non-voting. In excluding non-voters 
from the analysis across pairs of elections as shown in Table IT, we arbitrarily 
eliminate a potentially important source of electoral change. In Canada, for 
example, Clarke et al. (1979) show that movement into and out of the electorate is as 
important a source of variation in both individual voting behaviour and in electoral 
outcomes as is direct switching of votes. In the United States, which exhibits 
substantially higher levels of non-voting than the other three countries, the exclusion 
of non-voters may mask an important source of change, just as is the case with 
partisan independents. In any case, given that differences in voting turnout exist 
among the four countries, the inclusion of both voters and non-voters represents the 
most clearly defensible comparative analytic strategy. 
FinalIy, it may be noted that the simple two-election comparisons shown in Table 
11, although useful for purposes of replication, do not take full advantage of available 
panel data. All of the studies employed in the analysis are three-wave panels, and 
two of these (Canada and the United States) contain data on voting behaviour 
collected in three separate national elections. The British and Dutch panels, while 
containing only two election study waves, each contain a third initial wave of 
interviews with data on party identification and vote intention. The full use of the 
three-wave panels has a number of advantages, the most important of which is that it 
permits the investigation of multiple patterns of movement. A respondent who 
262 
changes party identification, for example, may do so by means of first becoming an 
independent, e.g. old party + non-identification +, new party, a pattern which is 
suggestive of either a two-stage process of realignment or of general partisan 
disintegration. In contrast, the pattern old party + non-identification + old party, 
although it likewise involves a reported change in each wave, clearly suggests only a 
short-term disaffection from partisanship and is inconsistent with any hypothesized 
process of realignment or de-alignment over time. In both cases, the two-wave panel 
will show simply a ‘change’ while the three-wave panel will provide additional clues 
to the particular nature of that change. The same will hold true with regard to the 
linkage between non-voting and vote switching across a series of elections. A process 
in which certain individuals continually move into and out of the electorate but never 
switch votes is clearly different to onc in which individuals switch frequently or in 
which non-voting and switching combine in various ways. 
As is seen in Table 111, the inclusion of both non-voters and non-identifiers in the 
analysis and the use of all three panel waves provide considerable additional 
information on the movement of partisanship and vote across time in the four nations 
as well as a more reliable basis for cross-national comparison. Perhaps the most 
important single observation that can be made is that in all cases the proportion of 
national samples reporting a stable partisanship and vote over time (Table IIIc) is 
sharply reduced. In the United States and the Netherlands, for example, it is only 
TABLE III. Summary of turnover in party identification and vote in- four three-wave panel studies 
~ ~~~ ~ 
Britain Canada Netherlands U.S.A. 
1969-7CL74 1914-7%30 197s71-72 1972-74-76 
(N = 421) (N = 791) (N = 711) (N = 772) 
(a) Party identification 
- maintaining the same party 
identification in three panel 
waves 
- changing party identification 
at least once 
- moving to or from non- 
identificationb 
(b) Voting behaviour‘ 
in three elections 
- voting for the same party 
- switching at least once 
- abstaining at least once 
(c) Percent reporting the same 
party identification AND vote 
in three panel waves 
64%’ 59% 
27 23 
12 22 
51% 49 % 
33 33 
23 24 
47 % 41% 
36% 68% 
30 11 
42 24 
49 9% 39% 
34 30 
22 39 
33 % 33% 
aMultiple response. Percentages total to more than 100% because categories are not mutually exclusive. 
bIncluding respondents who report non-identification in all three waves (Netherlands: 6%. U.S.A. : 4%, 
Canada: 3%, Britain: less than 1%). 
Tongressional vote for the United States and Second Chamber vote for the Netherlands. The 1969 British 
wave and the 1970 Dutch wave are vote intention reports. 
dBut excluding those respondents who report not voting in all three elections. This makes a significant 
difference only in the case of the United States, in which 18% of the total sample are three time 
non-voters. 
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33%, less than half the level suggested in Table 11. Even in Britain, which IS the 
country showing the highest combined stability of partisanship and vote, the 
percentage reporting perfect stability falls to 47%. Clearly, partisan and electoral 
stability, measured and analysed in this manner, is considerably less in all four 
nations than would otherwise be supposed. However, the specific reasons differ 
quite dramatically in each case. In the United States, the greater instability is due 
primarily to the high incidence of non-voting in that country. The percentage of 
American voters who report an actual switch in votes over three elections is slightly 
lower than in the other three countries, and the percentage reporting an outright 
change in party identification is markedly lower. But the very high rate of 
abstentions, coupled with the substantial degree of movement to non-identification 
across the panel, produces an electorate with a very high degree of discontinuity over 
time. In contrast the Netherlands, which shows equally high discontinuity, does not 
display unusually high rates either of vote switching or of abstention. Rather, the 
explanation in the Dutch case lies in the high level of movement to and from 
non-identification with parties. In part this reflects the tendency toward non- 
identification found in Dutch samples generally, although it should be noted that it is 
a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon. While 23% of the 1970 Dutch sample did 
not identify with any party (Table Ic), only 6% of the panel maintained a continuous 
position of non-identification across the three interviews, even though the period 
covered by the panel was little more than two years. This suggests that a party tie is 
more easily accepted and/or abandoned in the Netherlands than in the other three 
nations, perhaps, as the 2 x 2 comparison originally suggested, tending to travel with 
vote. Were it not for this high incidence of non-identification, the patterns of change 
in the Netherlands would be little different from those found in Canada or Britain. 
The British case is distinguished by a ?lightly higher over-all level of stability which 
is in turn brought about by the much lower tendency in Britain for respondents to 
move between partisanship and non-identification. The British sample contains the 
lowest proportion of independents at any single time point (Table Ia), and the 
number of respondents who maintain a position of non-identification continuously is 
negligible. Most British respondents report a party identification, even if not always 
the same one, throughout all three waves of the panel. The levels of partisan change. 
vote switching, and abstention in Britain are all comparable to those found in Canada 
and the Netherlands. 
Canada, in some respects, represents the centre of the distribution. Its over-all 
level of partisan/vote stability is lower than in Britain, but higher than in the 
Netherlands or  the United States. Levels of vote switching and abstention in Canada 
are comparable to those found in the other countries, and there is also substantial 
change in party identification and movement to and from non-identification across 
the three waves of the Canadian panel. Canada, like the other three nations, displays 
relatively high rates of change over this six-year period when all possible types of 
change are considered. Given that the Canadian federal party system is a relatively 
stable and enduring one, it is evident that its aggregate stability does not derive from 
any absence of change at the individual level. The same might generally be said of 
each of the four countries included in the analysis. 
As noted earlier, it is possible to identify with three-wave panel data not only the 
levels of change as shown in Table 111 but also particular patterns of change. It is 
probably not possible over relatively short periods of time positively to isolate 
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patterns of realignment or de-alignment, but it is not difficult to identify certain 
patterns which are inconsistent with either of these phenomena. Respondents, for 
example, who abandon a party tie only to return to it a short time later are following a 
classic pattern of deviation, while those who do not return represent one of several 
possible patterns of positive change (realignment, de-alignment, volatility, etc.). 
Where the change occurs in the second wave of the panel, it is possible to use the 
third wave to attempt to confirm the nature of that change. Where the change is 
observed in the third wave. no information exists which would permit more specific 
classification of the nature of t h e  change. The same sort of scrutiny can be applied 
to changes in partisanship and in voting behaviour, except that in the latter case it 
is necessary to provide a specific rule for the Classification of non-voters. An 
individual who follows the voting pattern ‘party A’ - abstention -+ ‘party B’ has a 
positive change pattern which might be associated with volatility or realignment, 
while one who follows the pattern ‘party A’ + abstention -+ ‘party A’ seems more 
likely to represent a classic rnobilization/demobilization pattern than one of positive 
change. It is possible then to distinguish with some degree of reliability in the 
three-wave panels two distinctive types of movement in party identification 
(deviation and positive change) and three distinctive types of movement in voting 
behaviour (deviation, positive change, and mobilization/demobilization). A 
regrouping of the data to identify these types of patterns for the four nations is shown 
in Table IV. 
TABLE IV. Specific stabilitykhange patterns in partisanship and vote in four three-wave panels 
(column percentages) 
Britain Canada Netherlands U.S.A. 
(N = 422) (N = 8.54) (N = 810) (N = 784) 
1969-7G74 1Y74-79-80 197&7 1-72 1972-74-76 
(a) Party idenrificarion 
- no change 64% 59% 36% 68 92 
- deviation (change followed 
by return to former party) 7 8 10 8 
- all positive change patternsa 16 25 38 15 
(third wave only) 12 8 16 9 
- no change 51% 49% 49% 39% 
- indeterminate changes 
(b) Voting behaviourb 
- deviation (change followed by 
- mobilization/demob. (one or 
return to former party) 4 5 5 6 
more abstentions but no 
other positive change) 15 16 15 31 
- all positive change patterns 20 24 21 15 
(third wave only) 10 6 10 9 
- indeterminate changes 
“Includes continuous non-identifiers (Netherlands: 6%, U.S.A.: 4%, Canada: 3%, Britain: less than 
’Congressional vote for the United States and Second Chamber vote for the Netherlands. The initial 
British and Dutch waves are vote intention reports. 
‘Respondents who report abstention in all three waves are excluded from the analysis. 
dIncluding third-wave nun-voters who report no other change. 
1%). 
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In each of the four countries, a modest amount of the change in both party 
identification and voting behaviour over time is accounted for by deviation, i.e. a 
change followed by a return to the former party. In spite of this, a segment of the 
electorate in all four countries (Table IVb) falls into a pattern termed ‘positive 
change’ with respect to electoral behaviour, i.e. a change that might conceivably 
represent a pattern of realignment or de-alignment of the electorate or that is at least 
a pattern of sustained volatility. The United States, however, stands out in two ways. 
It is, as noted earlier, the most stable country in terms of party identification and also 
shows the lowest incidence of ‘positive change’ in voting behaviour as well as in party 
identification. Secondly, the high level of non-voting in the United States is 
manifested largely in a ‘mobilization/demobilization’ pattern of electoral behaviour, 
i.e. movement into and out of the active electorate of persons whose behaviour is 
otherwise stable. At 31% (Table IVb), the United States is substantially higher than 
any of the other countries in the number of respondents displaying this pattern. In 
part, this is because of the tendency of voting participation in the United States to 
decline sharply in the ‘off year’ Congressional election. 
In both of the comparisons, it is evident that the American pattern of stable 
partisanship coupled with fluctuation in vote, while not unique to the United States, 
occurs much more frequently in that country than in any other. It is also evident that 
all countries, including the United States, exhibit significant changes over time in 
both voting behaviour and party identification when all possible types of change are 
taken into account. For the most part, such changes are ‘real’ rather than mere lapses 
or temporary deviations in an otherwise stable pattern. Nevertheless, party 
identification is more stable than voting behaviour in all of the countries studied 
except the Netherlands, although it is only in the United States that it is a great deal 
more stable. 
3. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AS A CROSS-TIME PREDICTOR 
A useful way of summarizing these data and testing the efficacy of party identification 
in each of the four national cases is to measure its ability to predict behaviour over 
time. In theory, party identification as measured in the first wave of a panel study 
should be a good predictor of identification in subsequent waves. It should be a less 
efficient predictor of voting behaviour, although such correlations will be influenced 
by the extent to which party identification travels with vote as well as by the incidence 
of non-voting. It should not deteriorate over time with respect to either party 
identification or vote, to the extent that wavering voters or non-voters exhibit a 
‘homing’ tendency. A test of these suppositions may be found in Table V, indicating 
the ability of party identification as measured in the first wave of the panels to predict 
party identification in the two subsequent waves and voting behaviour in all three 
waves. The statistic employed for this purpose is lambda, which indicates the 
proportionate reduction of error in prediction when the independent variable (in this 
case first-wave party identification) is known.6 
As a predictor of party identification in subsequent waves, first-wave party 
identification functions significantly better in the United States than in the other 
three nations, with and without the inclusion of non-identifiers. Predictions are 
poorest for the Netherlands, and deteriorate significantly between the second and 
third waves when non-identifiers are included in the analysis, reflecting the high 
TABLE V. Predictive ability of first-wave party identification across three wave panels in four nations 
(Asymmetric lambda coefficients for all panel cases in each wave. Lambda coefficients for analysis which 
excludes non-identifiers and non-voters shown in parentheses.) 
Party 
Vote Identification 
first wavea second wave third wave 2nd wave third wave 
(a) Britain .66 
1969-70-74 (.72) 
(b) Canada .54 
197479-80 ( ,771 
197&7 1-72 (.W 
(d) U.S.A. (Congress) .2Y 
1972-74-76 (.58) 
(.27) 
(c) Netherlands .72 
- presidential vote 1972-76 .16 
V o t e  intention for Britain and Netherlands. 
degree of movement in the Netherlands to and from non-identification. The 
correlations between first-wave party identification and vote, however, present an 
entirely different picture. The first-wave predictions are high in all cases except the 
United States, and exhibit significant deterioration across the three waves. The 
American predictions are much lower, even when non-voters and non-identifiers are 
excluded from the analysis. The correlation between party identification and vote in 
the 1972 U.S.A. presidential election is particularly low, suggesting the deviant 
nature of that election. In 1976, however, the correlation rises to .54 for identifiers 
and voters, a level about equal to that of the other three countries. Even for 
Congressional voting, the deterioration across the three panel waves is less for the 
United States than for the other countries. 
The general pattern of high correlations between party identification in subsequent 
panel waves and low correlation between party identification and vote is that which is 
most easily associated with the American electoral and party system, and it is 
noteworthy that it is only the United States which persistently exhibits this pattern. 
In the other cases, the tendency of party identification to travel with vote produces 
high initial correlations but rapid deterioration as the various types of movement 
documented earlier begin to disrupt the predictive power of first-wave identification. 
4. CONCLUSION 
It would be an overstatement to conclude from these analyses that party 
identification in the sense of an enduring psychological tie to a party is inapplicable 
outside the United States. Certainly, the electorates of all of the countries examined 
here contain a mix of partisan types, some of whom will conform very well to a classic 
reference group model of partisanship.’ But there are two broad conclusions that are 
inescapable when the classic concept of party identification is re-examined in a 
cross-time, cross-national context. First is the fact that all electorates, including that 
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of the United States, display a substantial amount of change over relatively short 
periods of time when all possible types of change are taken into account. While a 
considerable amount of this change is to non-identification and/or non-voting, a not 
insignificant amount in all cases, and a quite substantial amount in the case of Canada 
and the Netherlands, is of a ‘positive’ quality, suggesting a continuing dynamic rather 
than a kind of ‘steady state’. While the level of instability of party identification 
exceeds that of vote only in the case of the Netherlands, the level of instability in both 
is substantial in all of the cases examined. 
Secondly, it should be noted that the American electoral environment appears to 
be unique in its ability to combine stable party identification with instability of vote, a 
phenomenon observed in no other case. The concept of party identification, which 
presumes such a combination as the norm, thus functions much more effectively in 
the United States than in systems where it displays a marked tendency to travel with 
the vote rather than to be independent of it. This conclusion is substantiated by the 
properties of party identification as a cross-time predictor in each of the countries 
examined here. Although there have been different interpretations regarding the 
stability of party identification over time in the United States, when statistics 
measuring cross-time stability of party identification and vote in the United States 
are examined alongside those for other countries, the unique aspects of the 
American relationship become more clearly evident.8 
There is, of course, every reason why this should be expected. Budge and Farlie 
(1976), for example, found that party identification in the United States behaved in a 
unique manner in comparison with nine other nations when tested against socio- 
economic characteristics as a predictor of vote. It is also often noted that the United 
States exhibits a large number of unique institutional characteristics (frequent 
elections, long ballots, independent executive and legislature) and behavioural ones 
(low turnout, ticket splitting, etc.). To date, much of the research on party 
identification has been time-bound and nation-bound, limited to information 
collected in a single nation at a single point in time. As panel data have become 
available, the dynamic properties of party identification have become more evident 
and have engendered debate regarding its utility in electoral research. So too, the 
availability of comparable data for a number of nations has permitted new inter- 
pretations of the concept and its properties. But such findings do not in themselves 
challenge the validity and theoretical power of the party identification construct. 
Rather, they permit greater refinement of the concept and a deeper understanding of 
the ways in which it may or may not exhibit the same properties in a variety of 
political environments. It is only through such comparative and longitudinal inquiry 
that this understanding is possiblc. 
NOTES 
1 The Canadian election studies were conducted by Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc.and 
Jon Pammett and financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The 
co-investigators are not responsible for the analysis and interpretation of the data presented here. The 
1972-74-76 U.S.  Panel Study was conducted by the Center for Political Studies, University of 
Michigan, and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and the 
S.S.R.C. Survey Archive, University of Essex. Neither the principal investigators nor the archives are 
responsible for the analysis or interpretations presented here. The author is grateful to Mr. Eric 
Roughley of the S.S.R.C. Survey Archive, University of Essex, for his assistance in subsetting these 
data. 
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2 ’l’he‘ 1969 and 1970 waves of the British Election Study were conducted by David Butler and Donald 
Stokes, and the February 1974 wave was conducted by Ivor Crewe and BoSarlvik. The datawere made 
available to the author by the S.S.R.C. Survey Archive, University of Essex. Neither the principal 
investigators nor the archive are responsible for the analysis o r  interpretations presented here. 
3 The 197G73 Dutch Election Study was conducted by Felix Heunks, M. Kent Jennings, Warren Miller. 
Philip Stouthard, and Jacques Thomassen. The data wcre made availablc to the author by the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and the S.S.R.C. Survey Archive. Neither the 
principal investigators nor the archives are responsible for the analysis or interpretations presented 
here. 
4 These percentages are not identical to those derived by summation of Table I due to rounding. 
5 If Presidential vote rather than Congressional vote is uscd the pattern holds, but the percentage 
reporting the same party identification and vote is slightly lower (68%). The other cells vary from those 
shown in Table Ild by only 1% in each case. 
6 Lambda is suitable for use with nominal scale data and its value i s  not affected by the number of 
categories (i.e. number of parties). Its upper limit is 1. See Mueller et al. (1970,249-56). 
7 A detailed attempt to partition the Canadian electorate in these terms may be found in Clarke et al. 
(1979,301-19). 
8 A thorough review of this literature, together with an analysis of the American panel data, may be 
found in Converse (1976). 
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